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BROWN V. PLATA: RENEWING THE CALL TO END 
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING 
Steven Nauman∗ 
Abstract 
After more than twenty years of litigation, the United States 
Supreme Court finally determined whether California’s overcrowded 
prison system created a constitutional violation in Brown v. Plata. With 
prisons and jails across the country operating at well over 100% 
capacity, the Court concluded what advocates had been screaming for 
over a decade: prison overcrowding cannot be tolerated, and the only 
remedy is to reduce prison populations. What the Court failed to 
resolve, however, was what the primary cause of prison overcrowding is 
and how states and the federal government are supposed to comply with 
capacity expectations amid concerns for public safety and tough-on-
crime politics. 
This Note explores the most significant cause of prison 
overcrowding in the United States: mandatory minimum sentencing. 
Part I examines the evolution of mandatory minimum sentencing 
schemes and how the United States has arrived at the situation it finds 
itself in today. Part II discusses the current state of prison overcrowding 
in the United States and its economic implications. Part III analyzes 
how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata relates to mandatory 
minimum sentences. Finally, Part IV suggests solutions to our 
mandatory minimum mayhem. Overall, this Note offers the unavoidable 
conclusion that mandatory minimum sentencing in the United States 
must end. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With almost 2.3 million inmates (representing 743 inmates per 
100,000 citizens), the United States jails the largest share of its 
population in the world. Unsurprisingly, this zeal for incarceration has 
led to overcrowding at many federal, state, and local jails and prisons. 
At the end of 2008, the federal prison system was operating at 135% 
capacity. At the same time, twenty-eight states and seventeen of the 
nation’s largest counties were operating at over 100% capacity, while 
many more flirted with overcrowding. The numbers continue to soar, 
and with them the consequences: violence, disease, civil rights 
violations, and budgetary costs, to name a few. 
In the summer of 2011, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
California’s dire prison overcrowding situation in Brown v. Plata.1 The 
Court ultimately determined that conditions at California’s 
overpopulated prisons had become so horrendous that the only 
appropriate remedial measure was to require the State to drastically 
reduce its number of prisoners.2 California is not the only state suffering 
from an enormously overpopulated prison system. Indeed, states across 
the country face similar dilemmas. 
What the Court failed to address, however, was how California (and 
other states) are to accomplish the unenviable task of relieving its 
overcrowded prisons. The most obvious solution, of course, is that a 
certain number of prisoners must be released from prison in some 
manner—whether through parole, community control, or reduction in 
sentence to time served. Unfortunately, this solution is only cosmetic at 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 1947. 
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best. While releasing prisoners might meet the facial requirements of 
the Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata, the prison-overcrowding problem 
will only resurface unless something is done on a systemic level. 
Instead of asking how to go about releasing prisoners in order to 
reach a constitutionally permissible capacity, one should ask why 
American prisons are overcrowded in the first place. This Note explores 
the most significant cause of prison overcrowding in the United States: 
mandatory minimum sentencing. Part I examines the evolution of 
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes and how we have arrived at 
the situation we are in today. Part II discusses the current state of prison 
overcrowding in the United States and its economic implications. 
Part III analyzes how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata 
relates to mandatory minimum sentences. Finally, Part IV offers 
solutions to our mandatory minimum mayhem. 
I.  INDETERMINATE VS. DETERMINATE SENTENCING: AMERICA’S 
INCREASING OBSESSION WITH PUNISHMENT 
A.  Indeterminate Inadequacy 
To fully realize the implications of determinate (or mandatory 
minimum) sentencing, one must understand how mandatory minimum 
schemes have come to dominate American sentencing jurisprudence. 
Prior to mandatory minimum sentencing as it exists today,3 convicted 
                                                                                                                     
 3. It is important to note initially that mandatory minimum sentences have always 
existed in some form for certain offenses throughout American history. At our country’s 
inception, the bulk of mandatory minimum sentencing was aimed at the most egregious crimes 
against our newly formed republic: treason, piracy, insurrection, riot, and unlawful assembly. 
See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (punishing treason and piracy with mandatory 
death penalty); Act of July 14, 1798 (Sedition Act), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (punishing insurrection, 
riot, and unlawful assembly with mandatory minimum six month prison term); Act of Jan. 30, 
1799 (Logan Act), ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613 (punishing undermining U.S. interests with mandatory 
minimum six month prison term). Mandatory minimum punishments similarly continued to 
target treason and insurrection during and after the Civil War. See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 
33, 12 Stat. 284 (punishing conspiracy to overthrow United States government with mandatory 
six month prison term); Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 339 (punishing spies against the 
Union with mandatory death penalty); Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 696 (punishing 
correspondence with the Confederacy with mandatory minimum six month prison term); Act of 
July 1, 1864, ch. 204, 13 Stat. 343 (punishing desertion from U.S. Navy with mandatory 
minimum six month prison term). Later in the Nineteenth Century, mandatory minimum 
punishments began targeting slave trafficking along with various revenue offenses such as tax 
evasion, tax fraud, and counterfeiting. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 
(imposing mandatory minimum five year prison term for counterfeiting notes); Act of July 20, 
1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 125 (imposing mandatory minimum two year prison term for tax stamp 
fraud). And during the Prohibition Era, mandatory minimum punishments targeted the 
manufacture and sale of alcohol. See, e.g., National Prohibition (Volstead) Act, Pub. L. No. 66-
66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (punishing second and subsequent convictions for manufacturing or 
selling alcohol with mandatory minimum one month prison term). However, it was not until 
3
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criminals were primarily punished with indeterminate sentences; the 
length of a sentence was determined during imprisonment rather than at 
the actual sentencing.4 While the sentencing judge would order the 
prison term to be served, a parole board or commission ultimately 
decided whether a prisoner could be released before the end of that term 
based on his behavior in prison.5 It was therefore possible for a prisoner 
to be released early for good behavior, completion of drug treatment 
programs, or at any point when he was no longer viewed as a threat to 
society.6 Alternatively, a prisoner would be required to complete the 
maximum sentence prescribed by law because of poor behavior or any 
other indication that he was not fit to reenter public life.7 Judges 
themselves also contributed to sentence variation based on political or 
regional ideological influences.8 
The goal of indeterminate sentencing was, therefore, rehabilitation. 
It was believed that inmates should only spend the amount of time 
behind bars necessary to cure them of their criminal behavior.9 The 
concepts of blame and just deserts, although not completely rejected, 
                                                                                                                     
1951 that we began to see the Congress employing mandatory minimums to punish such a wide 
array of criminal activity. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Manda
tory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm (noting that most 
mandatory minimum penalties now relate to drug offenses, firearms, identity theft, and child sex 
offenses). Furthermore, mandatory minimum punishments today are, in general, far lengthier, 
far harsher, and far more expansive than those in earlier eras. See id. 
 4. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND DRUG POL’Y RESEARCH CTR., MANDATORY 
MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’ MONEY? 8 (1997). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See Neil Steinberg, The Law of Unintended Consequences, ROLLING STONE, May 5, 
1994, at 33, reprinted in CRIMINAL SENTENCING 41, 43 (Robert Emmet Long ed., 1995) (noting 
that sentences for similarly situated defendants differed greatly between liberal and conservative 
regions of the country). Correcting this sentence disparity across the United States emerged as 
the overall theme of determinate sentencing’s proponents and in the eventual evolution of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: 
The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for 
a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 187 (1993) (“An 
unjustifiable variation existed in the sentences imposed by judges on similarly situated 
defendants.”); CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (speculating that sentencing disparity among 
similarly situated defendants resulted in part from emotional considerations such as a judge’s 
character for sympathy or toughness). 
 9. See Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 455 
(1928) (“[S]ociety . . . has an interest in the welfare of the individual life . . . . Even a socially 
harmful criminal has a right, in justice, to be treated with those instrumentalities that give him 
the greatest promise of self-improvement and rehabilitation.”). 
4
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had no functional place under indeterminate sentencing.10 Indeterminate 
sentencing instead focused on “look[ing] forward, not backward” and 
pursuing the “more constructive goals”—as accomplished through the 
social sciences—of determining the roots of criminal activity within 
society as a whole and implementing appropriate social reforms and 
programs.11 As a result, probation and parole quickly emerged as 
essential institutions to divert defendants away from prisons and into 
more rehabilitative activities such as drug treatment, educational, or 
vocational programs.12 
Critics attacked indeterminate sentencing for not accomplishing the 
primary goals of incarceration. First, critics argued that indeterminate 
sentences did not effectively incapacitate career criminals or violent 
offenders.13 Judges gave reduced sentences to individuals who had 
never previously been convicted or who were willing to complete 
certain drug treatment or educational programs.14 Gain-time reductions 
were also awarded to inmates who sufficiently demonstrated good 
behavior while incarcerated, regardless of the inmate’s criminal 
history.15 And judges exercised even greater discretion by suspending 
prison sentences in favor of probation.16 Serious and repeat offenders, 
therefore, could spend only a fraction of the allowable sentence behind 
bars if they played the prison “game,” or even skip prison entirely by 
being placed on probation.17 Consequently, indeterminate sentences 
were thought not to adequately incapacitate criminals. 
Coupled with inadequate incapacitation was inadequate 
rehabilitation—the admitted core of the indeterminate sentencing 
concept18—creating what critics called a “revolving door” prison 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2003). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 175–77 (2003) (commenting on the rise of probation); Project, Parole 
Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 814–15 (1975) 
(commenting on the rise of parole). 
 13. CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 14. 
 14. Id. at 15. 
 15. See Chet Kaufman, A Folly of Criminal Justice Policy-Making: The Rise and Demise 
of Early Release in Florida, and its Ex Post Facto Implications, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 
366–69 (1999).  
 16. Hatch, supra note 8, at 186. 
 17. Jill Smolowe, . . . And Throw Away the Key, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, reprinted in 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING 46, 49 (Robert Emmet Long ed., 1995) (quoting Antoine McClarn, an 
inmate at the Cook County Jail). 
 18. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 8. 
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system.19 Opponents of indeterminate sentencing emphasized large rates 
of recidivism—the tendency of previously released prisoners to commit 
additional criminal offenses.20 For example, an eleven-state study for 
1983 revealed that 62.5% of state and federal prisoners who were 
released that year were rearrested within three years, and 46.8% of state 
and federal prisoners who were released were reconvicted within the 
same time period.21 Such enormous and intolerable rates, critics argued, 
suggested that the rehabilitative purpose behind indeterminate 
sentencing was not being accomplished.22 Instead, indeterminate 
sentencing released dangerous criminals into the general public only to 
wreak havoc and return to prison again.23 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See Smolowe, supra note 17, at 50–51; see also Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., 
Competing Sentencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 305 
(1993) (“In the 1970’s, members of the public and Congress denounced the ineffectiveness of 
the ‘revolving-door’ criminal justice system.”). A “revolving door” syndrome generally refers to 
a practice in which individuals return to a certain behavior or status, such as when children 
return in adulthood to live with their parents, when employees frequently gain and lose 
employment within the same occupation, or when recovering alcoholics relapse. See Revolving 
Door Syndrome Definition, BING DICTIONARY, http://www.bing.com/Dictionary/Search?q=defin 
e+revolving+door+syndrome (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). In criminology, the term “revolving 
door” refers to the idea of recidivism, meaning that criminals are prone to return to criminal 
behavior after being punished. Specifically, the concept of a “revolving door” prison system was 
first popularized by a negative television advertisement that aired during the 1988 United States 
presidential campaign. In the famous advertisement, produced on behalf of Republican 
candidate George H. W. Bush’s campaign, prisoners casually enter and leave a prison facility 
through a common revolving door, as if at their leisure. See REVOLVING DOOR (Bush-Quayle 
‘88, broadcast Oct. 5, 1988), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmwhdDv8VrM 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013). The advertisement was an attack on Democratic presidential nominee 
Governor Michael Dukakis’ policies, implying that dangerous criminals who were subjected to 
indeterminate sentencing schemes were being released into the general public before their full 
rehabilitation. See DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN ELECTION 
CAMPAIGNS, 1952–2008 120 (5th ed. 2010).  
 20. See ALEXIS M. DURHAM III, CRISIS AND REFORM: CURRENT ISSUES IN AMERICAN 
PUNISHMENT 143 (1994). 
 21. ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 1 (1989), available at http://bjs.ojp.usd 
oj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf. Other studies throughout the 1970s confirmed similar 
recidivism trends. See PETER B. HOFFMAN & BARBARA STONE-MEIERHOEFER, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORTING RECIDIVISM RATES: THE CRITERION/FOLLOWUP ISSUE 1 (1978) (identifying 
two studies that calculated recidivism rates between 50% and 80% (citing U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, MARSHALING CITIZEN POWER TO MODERNIZE CORRECTIONS 5 (1972) and R.L. 
GOLDFARB & L.R. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 9 (1977))), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pd 
ffiles1/Digitization/49098NCJRS.pdf. 
 22. See Robert Martinson, What Works?: Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 
35 THE PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974) (“With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that 
have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”); DURHAM, supra note 
20, at 150 (proposing that “the standard measure of program failure is recidivism”). 
 23. See DURHAM, supra note 20, at 143. 
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As a result of inadequate incapacitation and rehabilitation, critics 
pointed to the overall inability to deter future crime as indeterminate 
sentencing’s pervading deficiency.24 The idea behind deterrence is that 
when a person commits a crime, he is sufficiently punished to dissuade 
him from committing the same crime again—or any other crime for that 
matter—in the future.25 As a corollary, the general public also sees the 
criminal’s punishment and is similarly dissuaded from committing that 
crime.26 
Critics asserted that the problem with indeterminate sentencing was 
that there were no certain punishments for any specific crime.27 If a 
defendant won the favor of a lenient judge or played the game well 
enough, his punishment might not be too harsh; a potential sentence of 
years in prison could end up being only a few months, greatly 
undermining the punishment’s intended deterrent effect.28 The general 
public also could not be sure of what the punishment for a certain crime 
would be, thus making risk-taking individuals more likely to see only 
the economic benefit in a criminal activity.29 Moreover, the criminal 
who had already been punished for a crime and had become familiar 
with the inner workings of the penal system would realize that the cost 
of his crime could be a lot less than previously thought.30 The expected 
benefit of committing a crime, therefore, increases in light of the cost of 
a considerably more lenient punishment. 
The ideal of justice lies at the core of the American psyche, but 
when it came to indeterminate sentencing, our appetite simply was not 
satiated. “Punishment is an end in itself,” yet critics argued that 
indeterminate sentencing did not accomplish the penal and societal 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 9. 
 25. Id. at 13. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 199, 199–200 (1993) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-1030, at 38–40 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3221–23) (expressing Congress’s disappointment with indeterminate sentencing’s 
lack of deterrent effect)). 
 28. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 13. 
 29. Professor Gary S. Becker notes that the basic rules of economics apply to an 
individual’s choice to commit a crime. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 2–14 (Gary S. 
Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974). Just like any economic decision, “a person commits 
an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and 
other resources at other activities.” Id. at 9. The expected utility of a crime increases as the 
knowledge of punishment decreases. Id. at 9–10. Logically, therefore, if an individual lacks 
sufficient knowledge regarding the punishment he may receive, he will be more likely to 
overemphasize the utility of committing a crime. Interestingly, Professor Becker also notes the 
problematic lack of economic research on the “industry” of crime, speculating that such 
“neglect” has caused enormous societal and financial costs. Id. at 3–4. 
 30. See Smolowe, supra note 17, at 49 (noting that it is general knowledge among inmates 
how lenient sentences can be). 
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needs for retribution.31 Judicial discretion in indeterminate sentencing 
led to judges not imposing sufficiently harsh sentences on convicted 
criminals.32 Likewise, criminals did not serve enough time behind bars 
for the sentences that they did receive.33 Society’s goal in exacting 
justice against the individual who commits a crime—appropriately 
offsetting the evil of the crime committed—was, therefore, left 
unsatisfied. 
Although not a classic goal of penology,34 critics also touted 
indeterminate sentencing’s inability to induce cooperation with law 
enforcement.35 The rationale is similar to that of indeterminate 
sentencing’s inability to deter crime: if a criminal knows that he or she 
will be able to receive a reduced sentence based on good behavior or a 
lenient judge—or avoid a prison term altogether by receiving 
probation—why cooperate with prosecutors?36 And upon release from 
prison, anyone who “snitched” loses credibility and potentially faces 
retribution.37 The cost of cooperating with law enforcement, therefore, 
                                                                                                                     
 31. W.H. Moberly, Some Ambiguities in the Retributive Theory of Punishment, 25 PROC. 
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, NEW SERIES 289 (1925) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 195 (W. Hastie trans., T&T Clark 
1887) (1796) (“Juridical punishment . . . must in all cases be imposed only because the 
individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime.”). 
 32. CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 12. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 30–48 (5th 
ed. 2009) (examining history’s more dominant theories behind punishment). 
 35. CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 18–19. 
 36. Id. 
 37. “Snitch” is a pejorative slang term meaning to act as an informer (as in informing 
police about the crimes of others). Likewise, “snitch” may be used as a noun to describe 
someone who informs on the crimes of others. See Snitch Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/snitch (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). Common synonyms 
include “betray,” “disclose,” and “tell on.” See Snitch Entry, THESAURUS.COM, 
http://thesaurus.com/browse/snitch (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). “Snitching” strikes at the very 
heart of one of our most fundamental human values: loyalty. See Michael A. Simons, 
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 27 (2003) 
(“[D]isdain for cooperators is deeply embedded in our culture. In the playground, our children 
learn that no one likes a tattletale. In school, they learn that Benedict Arnold was despised for 
his treason. In church, they learn that Judas’s treachery led to Jesus’s death. And these lessons 
are continually reinforced by portrayals of the snitch and the rat in movies, in literature, and in 
popular culture.”). For their sin of disloyalty, cooperators are often subject to various forms of 
social retribution, ranging from ostracization to physical retaliation or death. See id. at 29–30. 
Even our courts have recognized the extreme aversion with which we view cooperators. See, 
e.g., United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 785 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Many view a cooperating 
witness as a betrayer or informer; unquestionably, such a person is not generally held in high 
regard.”); Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that being labeled 
as a “snitch” or a “rat” carries dangerous implications). 
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tends to outweigh the benefits under an indeterminate system.38 This 
mindset obviously leads to ineffective law enforcement, especially in 
preventing and prosecuting drug crimes, where finger-pointing provides 
a large basis for finding and producing evidence against offenders.39 
B.  Determinate Sentencing to the Rescue? 
Beginning in the 1970s, following numerous studies reporting on 
the inefficacy of indeterminate sentencing,40 critics of indeterminate 
sentencing supposedly found their solution in determinate sentencing 
schemes.41 Familiarly known as mandatory minimum sentencing, 
determinate sentencing schemes are effectively the opposite idea of 
indeterminate schemes; based on statutory language, a person who 
commits an enumerated offense must serve a specified amount of time 
behind bars.42 There is no parole, no gain-time, and no early release; the 
statutory minimum as defined by the legislature must be served.43 
Mandatory minimum sentencing has thrived at both the federal and 
state levels. In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act as 
part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, creating the 
United States Sentencing Commission.44 The Commission was charged 
primarily with the duty “to establish sentencing policies and 
practices . . . including guidelines to be consulted regarding the 
appropriate form and severity of punishment for offenders convicted of 
federal crimes.”45 The Commission’s magnum opus was the enactment 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, a nondiscretionary tool 
with which federal judges were to determine any given offender’s 
punishment.46 During this period, President Ronald Reagan, with the 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game 
Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 215–16 (2009). 
 39. CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 18. 
 40. See, e.g., Jack Meyerson, The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles and Indeterminate 
Sentencing: A Critique, 51 WASH. L. REV. 617 (1976); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Challenging the 
Rehabilitative Justification for Indeterminate Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System: The 
Right to Punishment, 21 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 12 (1977). 
 41. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 42. See id.  
 43. See id. There are, however, certain exceptions to this general rule. See infra note 189 
and accompanying text. 
 44. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
 45. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION 1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_ 
USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
 46. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
406–08 (2011) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/ 
2011_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/2011_Guidelines_Manual_Full.pdf. The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines essentially take the form of a grid that pits Offense Level on the vertical axis against 
Criminal History Category on the horizontal axis. Id. at 407. The Guidelines first assign a given 
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help of Congress, also ramped up the much-touted “War on Drugs” by 
passing unprecedented legislation that provided mandatory sentences 
for the possession, sale, and trafficking of various scheduled narcotics.47 
Over the decades, many states have enacted mandatory minimum 
sentences for various drug-related offenses as well.48 
While mandatory minimum sentencing in the United States surged 
primarily to combat drug-related crimes, today’s mandatory minimum 
schemes are by no means exclusively drug-related. Although the brunt 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was aimed at drug-related 
offenses, the Guidelines apply to convictions for all federal offenses.49 
Moreover, at least twenty-one states have enacted general sentencing 
guidelines that mirror—or at least function in the same manner as—the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.50 Many states have also promulgated 
                                                                                                                     
crime to one of forty-three Offense Levels depending on severity (determined by statute). Id. at 
408. The offender is then assigned to one of six Criminal History Categories according to the 
nature and recentness of any past criminal conduct. Id. The intersection of Offense Level and 
Criminal History Category on the grid indicates a narrow range of months within which the 
offender must be sentenced. Id. at 407. For example, an offender who is convicted of one count 
of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 with no prior criminal history would 
be assigned to Offense Level 22 and Criminal History Category I. The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines would require a judge to sentence that offender to no less than forty-one months and 
no more than fifty-one months in prison. Id. Until 2005, these sentencing guidelines were 
mandatory; a federal judge had no discretion to deviate from the prescribed range of months for 
any reason. See infra note 189 (commenting on Congress’s intent to make the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines nondiscretionary). Although the United States Supreme Court has since 
declared the Guidelines only “advisory,” the Guidelines continue to function constructively as 
mandatory sentences today. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (instructing 
trial court judges to consider a wide range of factors outside those promulgated by the 
Guidelines during the sentencing phase); see also infra Section I.D. 
 47. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789. 
 48. See, e.g., State Info, NAT’L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS (NORML), 
http://norml.org/states (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (providing state-by-state information on 
mandatory minimum sentences regarding the use and possession of marijuana). 
 49. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 46, at 406–08. 
 50. In 2008, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) conducted a survey to examine 
sentencing guidelines in each state and the District of Columbia. The NCSC identified twenty-
one jurisdictions with sentencing guideline structures: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, 
the District of Columbia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 6–26 (2008), available at http://www.ncsc. 
org/sitecore/content/microsites/csi/home/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/State_Sentencing_Guide
lines.ashx. However, the NCSC noted numerous difficulties in attempting to identify 
jurisdictions that used sentencing guidelines. For example, some states may employ sentencing 
guidelines, but do not exhibit the formalities that the twenty-one jurisdictions named above 
exhibit, such as statutes, sentencing commissions, or review boards. Id. at 3. Conversely, a state 
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mandatory sentencing statutes that target repeat offenders or specifically 
enumerated violent felonies.51 For example, California’s infamous 
Three Strikes law provides a twenty-five-year-to-life sentence for 
offenders who commit a third “violent” or “serious” felony.52 Florida’s 
similarly infamous 10-20-Life law enhances punishments for any 
offender who “carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use 
any weapon or firearm” during the commission of a felony.53 
Mandatory minimum sentencing schemes take many forms, but their 
overall purpose is the same: to provide tougher punishments for 
criminals. 
Proponents asserted that determinate, mandatory minimum 
sentences attended to all of the problems that indeterminate sentencing 
failed to address; specifically, mandatory minimums sufficiently 
deterred, incapacitated, and punished criminals.54 Proponents also 
praised mandatory minimums for encouraging cooperation with law 
enforcement, leading to increased apprehension of career criminals.55 
Whether aimed at preventing drug use or doling out more severe 
punishments for serious offenders, mandatory minimum sentencing 
                                                                                                                     
may indeed present the formalities of a sentencing guideline scheme, but the sentencing 
guidelines are no longer operational. Id. 
 51. See James Austin et al., “Three Strikes and You’re Out”: The Implementation and 
Impact of Strike Laws 6–11 & tbl.1 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice Research Paper, 2000) (comparing the 
habitual offender laws of twenty-four states), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/181297.pdf. 
 52. CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(e) (Deering 2013); id. § 1170.12(c)(2). 
 53. FLA. STAT. § 775.087(1) (2012). Specifically, 10-20-Life requires mandatory ten-year, 
twenty-year, and twenty-five-year-to-life prison sentences for possessing a firearm, shooting a 
firearm, and shooting a person, respectively, while committing a felony. Id. However, while 10-
20-Life is known publicly through its slogan “Use a Gun and You’re Done,” the enhanced 
mandatory penalties equally apply to an offender who commits any aggravated battery during 
the commission of a felony, regardless of whether he possesses or uses a firearm. Id. 
§ 775.087(2)(a); see also FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., 10-20-LIFE, NEW MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON 
SENTENCES, available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/secretary/press/1999/1020life.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2013) (providing information about 10-20-Life and access to promotional 
materials). Although Governor Jeb Bush and the Florida legislature passed the law in 1999, 10-
20-Life was actually one of several mandatory minimum schemes enacted during Governor 
Bush’s tenure that targeted violent or habitual offenders. See, e.g., Violent Career Criminals 
Act, FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(c)–(d) (2012) (providing enhanced mandatory sentences for 
criminals who have previously been convicted of at least two felonies or of one of the statutorily 
enumerated “qualified offense[s]”); FLA. STAT. § 775.082(9)(a) (2012) (providing enhanced 
mandatory sentences for criminals who have committed any enumerated felony within three 
years of being released from any state or federal prison); Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender 
Act, FLA. STAT. § 794.0115 (2012) (providing an enhanced mandatory sentence of twenty-five-
years-to-life imprisonment for sexual offenders who “[c]ause[] serious personal 
injury . . . [u]se[] or threaten[] to use a deadly weapon . . .or [v]ictimize[] more than one person” 
during a sexual offense). 
 54. CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 55. Id. at 18–19. 
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finds its rationale as a tougher approach to what the American public 
views as increased crime in the United States. 
C.  Determinate Disappointment 
What critics failed to realize about mandatory minimum sentences 
was that they were, in fact, mandatory. Although judges could vary 
prison sentences under very specific, rare circumstances,56 
manipulative, tough-on-crime politicians and a fearful public effectively 
destroyed judicial discretion in sentencing. Judges could deviate slightly 
below mandatory sentences for some defendants who cooperated with 
prosecutors or provided information on other criminals.57 Likewise, 
judges could deviate slightly above maximum sentences for particularly 
aggravating factors, such as violence against minors.58 Regardless, the 
majority of mandatory minimum sentences conform to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.59 
The horror stories are endless. In 1990, Tonya Drake was persuaded 
by a man in a parking lot to mail a package on his behalf for $100.60 Not 
knowing what was in the package, but in desperate need of money to 
feed her children (Mrs. Drake was a twenty-eight-year-old mother of 
four), she agreed.61 The package contained 232 grams of crack 
cocaine.62 Despite the fact that Drake had no criminal history, a federal 
judge was required to sentence Drake to a mandatory minimum ten-year 
prison sentence.63 On sentencing Drake, Judge Richard A. Gadbois Jr. 
lamented, “This woman doesn’t belong in prison for 10 years for what I 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 57. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 46, at 10; see also infra note 189 and accompanying 
text. 
 58. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 46, at 6; see also infra note 189 and accompanying 
text. 
 59. In its October 2011 report to Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission 
found that of the 10,605 offenders who were subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at 
sentencing, 66.1% of sentences were within the ranges prescribed by the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 140, tbl.7-4 (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/
Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_PDF/Chapter_07.pdf. An additional 2.5% of 
sentences exceeded the Guidelines’ ranges because of upward departures. Id. Only 24.5% of 
judges gave downward departures below the Guidelines’ ranges. Id. The remaining 7.0% of 
sentences received prosecution-sponsored downward departures. Id. 
 60. See Smolowe, supra note 17, at 46. 
 61. Id. at 46–47. 
 62. Id. at 47. 
 63. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 141–42 (1999). 
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understand she did. That’s just crazy, but there’s nothing I can do about 
it.”64 
Drake’s is not the only “crazy” result of a mandatory minimum 
sentencing scheme. At the age of nineteen, Jason Cohn was sentenced to 
ten years in prison for mailing LSD blotter paper.65 Keith Edwards, also 
nineteen years old, sold crack cocaine to a federal informant who then 
set up four more buys for the specific purpose of accumulating enough 
crack cocaine for prosecutors to get Edwards sentenced to a mandatory 
ten years.66 George Norris was sentenced to a mandatory seventeen 
months in prison for unknowingly collecting rare orchids in violation of 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.67 And 
Santos Reyes was sentenced to a mandatory twenty-six-years-to-life for 
taking the written portion of a driver’s license examination for his 
cousin.68 
In Florida, the horror stories are similarly shocking. Richard Paey 
was a law student who suffered back injuries resulting from a car 
accident.69 Doctors prescribed Paey various painkillers after several 
failed surgeries, but when he ran out, Paey began forging prescriptions 
to obtain the necessary medications.70 Although he never sold or 
transferred medications to any other person, Paey was convicted of 
seven counts of trafficking oxycodone.71 Each count carried a 
mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, meaning that Paey was to 
serve a minimum of 175 years in prison.72 Had Governor Charlie Crist 
not granted Paey a full pardon on September 20, 2007, Paey would be 
serving a constructive life sentence at Tomoka Correctional Institution 
in Daytona Beach, Florida.73 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 142. 
 65. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 41. Blotter paper is a common method by which LSD 
is distributed and consumed. Blotter paper is a sheet of paper soaked in LSD solution and 
divided into many smaller squares, each representing a single dose. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUGS & CHEMICAL 
INFORMATION, D-LYSERGIC ACID DIETHYLAMIDE (2013), available at http://www.dea 
diversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/lsd/lsd.pdf. 
 66. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 41. 
 67. Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, THE ECONOMIST, 
July 22, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16636027. 
 68. Bob Egelko, 26 to Life for Taking an Exam: Man Took Cousin’s Drive Test—Strike 3, 
SFGATE (Dec. 30, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/26-to-life-for-taking-
an-exam-Man-took-cousin-s-2524459.php. 
 69. Paey v. State, 943 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), cert. denied, 954 So. 2d 28 
(Fla. 2007). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 921. 
 72. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1)(c) (2012). 
 73. Jamal Thalji, Paey Given Full Pardon, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 20, 2007, 11:58 
AM), http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/content/paey-given-full-pardon. 
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In addition to the countless victims suffering the wrath of ridiculous 
and unjust mandatory minimum sentences, determinate sentencing has 
also failed to address the “problems” that critics associated with 
indeterminate sentencing. While critics argued that determinate 
sentencing would fix indeterminate sentencing’s inadequate 
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence issues, recidivism rates in 
the United States have only increased since the mandatory minimum 
boom. Between 1983 and 1994, the percent of criminals who re-
offended within three years of being released from state or federal 
prison increased from 62.5% to 67.5%.74 Furthermore, the percent of 
parolees successfully discharged from supervision steadily declined 
from 54% to 41% between 1983 and 2000, again indicating an increase 
in re-offending.75 If mandatory minimum sentences were to sufficiently 
address society’s interest in deterring, incapacitating, and rehabilitating 
criminals (especially career criminals and violent offenders), why is it 
that the amount of crimes being committed by parolees and criminals 
sentenced to mandatory minimums has only gone up? Perhaps critics of 
indeterminate sentencing will next advocate indefinite sentences for all 
crimes. 
Moreover, the federal government and many states have also 
repealed or significantly limited parole and gain-time allowances in 
order to maintain a tough-on-crime façade. The federal government 
                                                                                                                     
 74. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 11 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.us 
doj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. By offense category, the largest rise in recidivism occurred 
among drug offenders; between 1983 and 1994, the recidivism rate increased from 50.4% to 
66.7%. Id. 
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REENTRY TRENDS IN THE U.S.: 
SUCCESS RATES FOR STATE PAROLEES (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/reent 
ry/tables/successtab.cfm (noting additionally that while the overall rate of parole success 
decreased between 1983 and 2000, the rate held steady at 40%–42% between 1994 and 2000; 
years 1988 through 1990 witnessed the lowest rates of parole success at 35%–36%); see also 
JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., BEYOND THE PRISON 
GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE IN AMERICA 21 fig.15 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
UploadedPDF/310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf (finding that the number of parole violators 
who returned to prison increased by about 800% between 1977 and 2000). The United States 
Sentencing Commission has issued numerous reports since the institution of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines commenting on various factors affecting recidivism. In one report, the 
Commission noticed a negative correlation between age and probability of recidivism: as an 
offender’s age increases, the likelihood of re-offending after release decreases. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 16 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Resear 
ch_Publications/Recidivism/200405_Recidivism_Criminal_History.pdf. While this may seem 
somewhat intuitive—the older a person is, the less time remaining in his life to re-offend—the 
implications of such an observation should be alarming: mandatory minimum sentences are not 
deterring younger offenders. Instead, this correlation seems to indicate that the more powerful 
deterrent is age. 
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abolished parole for all federal offenders with the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984.76 Likewise, as of 2000, at least sixteen 
states have abolished discretionary parole altogether, and at least 
another four states have abolished discretionary parole for certain 
violent offenders.77 
Florida is one state that appears to be leading the way in slimming 
down parole and early release options. Currently, parole in Florida may 
only be granted by statute and is severely constrained; inmates must 
serve the vast majority of a mandatory minimum sentence before even 
being considered for parole.78 Gain-time reductions are similarly 
circumscribed. The Florida legislature permits gain-time reductions “in 
order to encourage satisfactory prisoner behavior, to provide incentive 
for prisoners to participate in productive activities, and to reward 
prisoners who perform outstanding deeds or services.”79 But the 
accumulation of gain-time reductions is limited to 15% of time to be 
served; in other words, all inmates must serve at least 85% of the 
original sentence imposed.80 Overall, “little early release remains 
available” in Florida today.81 
Without adequate parole or early release mechanisms, recidivism 
rates will only continue to climb. Due to the mandatory nature of 
mandatory minimum schemes and decades of tough-on-crime trends, 
                                                                                                                     
 76. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE 
SYSTEM 1–2 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/uspc/history.pdf (affirming that while 
parole has been eliminated at the federal level, the U.S. Parole Commission continues to exist in 
order to oversee inmates who were sentenced or paroled prior to 1987 and are, therefore, still 
considered parole-eligible). 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REENTRY TRENDS IN THE U.S.: 
RELEASES FROM STATE PRISON (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/reentry/relea 
ses.cfm. The Department of Justice distinguishes between discretionary parole and mandatory 
parole mechanisms. Mandatory parole occurs when a state’s sentencing statutes require that an 
inmate be released after serving a specific amount of time or proportion of his sentence. Id. On 
the other hand, discretionary parole occurs when a parole board examines an inmate and 
determines whether or not he should be released from prison. Id. 
 78. See FLA. STAT. § 947.16(2)(g)(1)–(3) (2012). Section 947.16(g) trifurcates mandatory 
minimum sentences for purposes of determining when a parole interview for a given inmate 
may be conducted. Subsection 1 permits a parole interview for inmates serving mandatory 
minimum terms of seven years or less no earlier than six months before the end of their 
sentence. Id. Subsection 2 permits a parole interview for inmates serving mandatory minimums 
between seven and fifteen years no earlier than twelve months before their sentence ends. Id. 
Finally, subsection 3 permits a parole interview for inmates serving mandatory minimums 
exceeding fifteen years no earlier than eighteen months before their sentence ends. Id. 
 79. FLA. STAT. § 944.275(1) (2012). 
 80. FLA. STAT. § 944.275(4)(b)(3) (2012). Before 1995, Florida allowed a greater amount 
of gain-time reductions, which resulted in prisoners’ only serving between 30% and 60% of the 
sentences imposed. Kaufman, supra note 15, at 406–07. Public outrage over Florida’s seemingly 
lenient sentencing policies spurred the tough-on-crime and “truth in sentencing” movement that 
resulted in the state’s 85% rule that remains in effect today. Id. at 406. 
 81. Kaufman, supra note 15, at 413. 
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prisoners now lack the incentives to engage in productive and 
rehabilitative activities that would reduce the likelihood of re-offending 
upon release. “By subjecting inmates to coerced and regimented 
idleness” instead of allowing them to engage in socially productive 
activities, crime becomes the only trade that ex-inmates know.82 Upon 
release after an excessive mandatory sentence, it should not be at all 
surprising that ex-inmates with no experience in anything other than 
crime re-offend, thus creating an endless cycle of crime. Mandatory 
minimum schemes, therefore, yield an even crueler and costlier criminal 
sentencing structure than indeterminate sentencing. 
D.  Pushing Back Against the Mandatory Minimum Mess 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been under constant 
scrutiny ever since their enactment in 1987. Within two years, the 
United States Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality 
of the Commission and its Guidelines in Mistretta v. United States.83 
Petitioner John Mistretta contended that the formation of the 
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine.84 The Court, 
however, disagreed, concluding that Congress indeed had the authority 
to delegate its power to the Commission and that the Commission 
wielded the power to promulgate rules on behalf of Congress.85 
Critics also frequently—though unsuccessfully—attacked the 
Guidelines and other state mandatory minimum schemes as violating 
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.86 The 
Supreme Court, however, has ruled on numerous occasions that 
mandatory sentences imposed at both the federal and state levels do not 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement for 
punishments and are, therefore, not unconstitutionally cruel or 
unusual.87 Perhaps the most well-known Eighth Amendment attack on a 
mandatory minimum sentence was Ewing v. California.88 In Ewing, the 
trial court sentenced petitioner Gary Ewing to a mandatory minimum 
twenty-five-year-to-life prison sentence under California’s Three 
Strikes Law for stealing three golf clubs.89 On finding that the trial court 
                                                                                                                     
 82. James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and 
the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1063 (1997). 
 83. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 84. Id. at 370. 
 85. Id. at 374. 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 87. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957 (1991). 
 88. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 89. Id. at 18, 20.  
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did not err in imposing the sentence,90 a majority of the Supreme Court 
decided that state mandatory minimum schemes do not transgress 
constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because 
they “reflect[] a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that 
offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who 
continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.”91 
The Supreme Court has admitted, however, that certain problems 
are inherent in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and state mandatory 
minimum schemes. In Blakely v. Washington,92 the Court addressed the 
circumstances under which a trial judge may sentence a convicted 
defendant above a maximum sentencing guideline range.93 The Blakely 
Court ultimately commanded state trial judges to base sentencing solely 
on facts decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the 
defendant, rather than facts determined by the sentencing judge to be 
true.94 Six months later, in United States v. Booker,95 the Court extended 
the Blakely ruling to federal courts and expanded its rationale, 
instructing trial judges to consider a wider range of factors in sentencing 
beyond those prescribed in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.96 As a 
result, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines officially became 
“advisory.”97 
Even Congress has noticed certain illogical and unfair elements 
within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and has responded by 
enacting what is referred to as the “safety valve.”98 Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, defendants were originally sentenced regardless 
of whether they were low-level offenders, despite Congress’s intent.99 
Congress, however, linked punishment to quantity of drugs, effectively 
imposing the same sentences on low-level drug users as on high-level 
drug traffickers.100 Since Congress enacted the safety valve provisions, 
trial court judges can now exercise their discretion to deviate below the 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Although the Court acknowledged that, “[t]o be sure, Ewing’s sentence is a long one.” 
Id. at 30. 
 91. Id. One must wonder, however, how the Court concluded that stealing three golf clubs 
constituted a “serious” or “violent” felony. 
 92. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 93. Id. at 300. 
 94. Id. at 303–04. 
 95. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 96. Id. at 243. 
 97. Id. at 245. 
 98. Section 80001 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-322, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), and § 5C1.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are 
collectively referred to as the “safety valve” provisions. Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve 
Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
1471, 1472 & n.7 (2000). 
 99. See Froyd, supra note 98, at 1471. 
 100. Id. 
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Guidelines’ mandatory punishments for low-level, “less culpable” 
offenders.101 Congress also passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to 
address the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder 
cocaine crimes.102 By implementing the safety valve and to some extent 
equalizing certain drug offenses, Congress attempted—although 
unsuccessfully103—to restore some sanity to the Guidelines. 
Some states are taking real steps to reduce or repeal their mandatory 
minimum sentencing schemes. In 2010, South Carolina enacted the 
Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act104 as a proactive 
solution to address America’s “counter-productive approach to criminal 
justice.”105 Among its more important modifications to South Carolina’s 
sentencing structure are reducing punishments for nonviolent crimes 
and providing alternatives to imprisonment—such as probation and 
work release—for drug offenders.106 Voters in California approved 
similar measures by passing Proposition 36, which allowed nonviolent 
drug offenders to receive probation instead of a mandatory sentence.107 
However, despite these numerous initiatives at the state level and 
calls from advocacy groups across the country to end mandatory 
minimum schemes,108 there is actually new and pending federal 
legislation to enact more mandatory minimum sentences.109 Overall, it 
appears that the debate between determinate and indeterminate 
sentencing is far from over. 
                                                                                                                     
 101. 28A C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 493 (2012). 
 102. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified at 21 
U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 844, 960 (2010)). 
 103. See Froyd, supra note 98, at 1498 (finding the safety valve “too restrictive,” ultimately 
undermining Congress’s goal in abating unfair sentences for low-level offenders). 
 104. S. 1154, 118th Sess. (S.C. 2010). 
 105. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, SOUTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC SAFETY REFORM: 
LEGISLATION ENACTS RESEARCH-BASED STRATEGIES TO CUT PRISON GROWTH AND COSTS 7 
(2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentenc 
ing_and_corrections/PSPP_South_Carolina_brief.pdf. 
 106. See id. at 6–7. 
 107. Proposition 36 Ballot Initiative (2000 General Election), CAL. DEP’T OF ALCOHOL & 
DRUG PROGRAMS, http://www.adp.state.ca.us/SACPA/Proposition_36_text.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2013). 
 108. See, e.g., About Us, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (FAMM), 
http://www.famm.org/aboutus.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2013); Key Issues: Drug Sentencing and 
Penalties, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/drug-
sentencing-and-penalties (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
 109. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2012) (providing mandatory penalties for child 
pornography offenders); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (providing mandatory penalties for 
firearm and drug trafficking offenses); SAFE DOSES Act, S. 1002, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) 
(providing mandatory penalties for theft of medical products); LEAVE Act, H.R. 1196, 112th 
Cong. § 101 (2011) (providing mandatory penalties for smuggling aliens into the United States); 
Piracy Suppression Act, H.R. 2839, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (providing mandatory penalties for 
maritime piracy). 
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II.  PRISON OVERCROWDING IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Overcrowding in General 
Americans enjoy being the best. And if there is one thing the United 
States does better than anyone else in the world, it is imprisoning its 
people. By now the statistics are indisputably clear, and have been the 
subject of myriad studies, yet they bear repeating. Between 1980 and 
2009, the total number of inmates incarcerated in state and federal 
prison facilities skyrocketed, increasing by approximately 361%;110 the 
total U.S. population only grew approximately 35% during the same 
time period.111 In 2010, the total number of adults under some form of 
correctional supervision—prison, jail, pretrial detention, parole, 
probation, or community control—totaled 7.1 million, approximately 
2.3% of the country’s population.112 The total number of state and 
federal prisoners alone was more than 1.5 million.113 
The proportion of Americans sitting in cells far surpasses that of any 
other country in the world. Russia and China only imprison 568 and 122 
criminals per 100,000 citizens, respectively.114 The United States’ 
incarceration rate of 743 inmates per 100,000 citizens, therefore, 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATION RATE: 
1980–2009, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/incrttab.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2012) [hereinafter INCARCERATION RATE] (reporting that in 1980, there were 139 
inmates per 100,000 citizens, and in 2009, there were 502 inmates per 100,000 citizens). It is 
important to note here that other institutional studies report higher incarceration rates than the 
Department of Justice’s approximation. For example, the International Centre for Prison Studies 
at the University of Essex estimates that the incarceration rate in the United States at the end of 
2009 was 743 inmates per 100,000 citizens, as opposed to the Department of Justice’s estimate 
of 502 inmates per 100,000 citizens. See ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, 
WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 tbl.2 (9th ed. 2011) [hereinafter WORLD PRISON POPULATION 
LIST]. The key distinction between the two reports is that the Department of Justice does not 
consider pretrial detainees in its calculation—instead limiting the rate to include only sentenced 
inmates—while the International Centre for Prison Studies does. For comparative purposes, this 
Note will reference the International Centre for Prison Studies’ estimation of the United States’ 
incarceration rate. 
 111. See Population, GOOGLE PUBLIC DATA, http://www.google.com/publicdata (follow 
“U.S. Census Bureau” hyperlink; then follow “Population in the U.S.” hyperlink; then follow 
“Explore the data” hyperlink) (indicating that the U.S. population grew from 226,542,300 in 
1980 to 306,771,500 in 2009). 
 112. LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 1 & fig.1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf. In 2010, the population of the United States was 
308,745,538. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND 
CHANGE: 2000–2010 2 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2 
010br-01.pdf. 
 113. See INCARCERATION RATE, supra note 110, at 3 tbl.2. 
 114. WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST, supra note 110, at 4 tbl.3, 5 tbl.4. 
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exceeds the incarceration rates of Russia and China combined.115 The 
highest incarceration rates in Europe are found in the former Soviet-
bloc states Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with 381, 
338, 314, 276, and 254 inmates per 100,000 citizens, respectively.116 
Western countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Spain, and Italy also imprison at only a fraction of the rate that the 
United States does.117 With a total of 2.29 million inmates (including 
pretrial detainees) at the end of 2009, the United States houses almost 
half of the world’s sentenced prisoners.118 Indeed, if incarceration were 
an Olympic event, the United States would win gold.119 
As a result of our prison preeminence, it should be no surprise, then, 
that the United States suffers from a prison-overcrowding crisis. At the 
end of 2008, the federal prison system was operating at 135% 
capacity.120 At the same time, twenty-eight states were operating at over 
100% capacity, with eleven others operating between 90% and 100% 
capacity.121 These numbers are a sharp increase from the capacity rates 
reported eight years earlier; in 2000, states reported capacity rates that 
                                                                                                                     
 115. The International Centre for Prison Studies notes that while China houses 
approximately 1.65 million prisoners, an additional 650,000 inmates are held as “administrative 
detainees.” Id. at 1. Although China does not consider these detainees as prisoners for purposes 
of calculating incarceration rate, if these detainees are included in the incarceration rate, China’s 
rate rises to approximately 127 inmates per 100,000 citizens. Id. at 4 tbl.3. In either case, the 
combined total incarceration rate for Russia and China is less than the United States’ rate of 743 
inmates per 100,000 citizens. 
 116. Id. at 5–6 tbl.4. 
 117. The United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, France, and Germany imprison at a rate of 396, 
159, 111, 96, and 85 inmates per 100,000 citizens, respectively. Id. at 5 tbl.4. 
 118. Id. at 1, 3 tbl.2. 
 119. California, Texas, and Florida lead the way in terms of total prison population by 
state. WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2008 17–18 app’x tbl.2 (2009) (revised 2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov 
/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. In fact, between 2007 and 2008, Florida’s prison population grew by 
approximately 21%, the second largest incarceration increase in the country (Pennsylvania holds 
the largest increase at 28%). Id. at 7 & fig.5. 
 120. Id. at 44 app’x tbl.24. The term “capacity” can actually be rather confusing, as the 
Department of Justice uses three different measures to constitute “capacity”: rated capacity, 
operational capacity, and design capacity. Rated capacity is “the number of beds or inmates 
assigned by a rating official to institutions within the jurisdiction.” Id. at 13. Operational 
capacity is “the number of inmates that can be accommodated based on a facility’s staff, 
existing programs, and services.” Id. Design capacity is “the number of inmates that planners or 
architects intended for a facility.” Id. The only data available for the federal prison system is its 
rated capacity. See id. at 44 app’x tbl.24. 
 121. Id. at 44–45 app’x tbl.24. California took the top spot, operating its prisons at 204% 
capacity; Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, and Nevada rounded out the top five at 188%, 167%, 
150%, and 148%, respectively. Id. In 2008, Florida operated its prisons at 88% capacity. Id. 
Again, it is important to note the distinctions between the various measures of capacity. See 
supra note 120. 
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were, on average, 10%–14% lower than in 2008.122 Local jails are also 
experiencing the same misfortune. Of the fifty counties jailing the 
largest number of individuals in the United States in 2008, seventeen 
operated at over 100% capacity.123 An additional sixteen counties 
operated between 90% and 100% capacity.124 Again, these rates can 
only be expected to increase; considering the rate at which we imprison, 
overcrowding is inevitable. 
B.  Economic Implications of Incarceration 
With such a significant number of individuals sitting in cells, the 
cost to maintain our prison population is mammoth. In 2007, federal, 
state, and local governments spent more than $74 billion on 
corrections.125 Adjusted for inflation, this represents a 255.3% increase 
in correctional spending from the approximately $21 billion spent in 
1982.126 Per capita, this means American taxpayers paid approximately 
$246 per citizen on corrections in 2007, up from $92 per citizen in 1982 
(an increase of 267%).127 
Because the majority of inmates are held within state and local 
facilities, the brunt of the cost of maintaining our current correctional 
system falls squarely on state and local governments.128 Over the past 
thirty years, state governments have generally accounted for about 60% 
of all corrections expenditures in the United States and spend seven to 
ten times more than the federal government on incarceration costs per 
year.129 In 2001, states spent a total of $29.5 billion on corrections, 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 9. 
 123. See Jails Stuffed to Capacity in Many U.S. Counties, NPR (Jan. 20, 2010, 6:20 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122336311. In Florida, Polk, Lee, and 
Miami-Dade Counties were operating at 131%, 131%, and 121% capacity, respectively. Id. 
 124. See id. In Florida, Orange, Broward, and Hillsborough Counties made the list at 99%, 
96%, and 92% capacity, respectively. Id. 
 125. TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT, FY 1982–2007: STATISTICAL TABLES 5 tbl.2 (2011), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jee8207st.pdf. Between 2002 and 2007, the 
amount spent on the corrections function of our legal system actually decreased 2.3%. Id. But 
see JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF 
INCARCERATION 10 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ 
incarceration-2010-06.pdf [hereinafter BUDGETARY COST] (noting that, in 2008, the total amount 
expended on corrections again surpassed $75 billion). 
 126. See KYCKELHAHN, supra note 125, at 5 tbl.2. This equals a little over $202 million per 
day. 
 127. See id. at 6 tbl.6. 
 128. The budgetary cost of corrections is actually spread relatively proportionally among 
federal, state, and local governments according to the number of inmates that each level 
monitors. See BUDGETARY COST, supra note 124, at 10 & fig.6. 
 129. See KYCKELHAHN, supra note 125, at 6 tbl.5; BUDGETARY COST, supra note 125, at 10 
& fig.6. 
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representing a cost of $22,650 per inmate per year.130 Although 
California, New York, and Texas spent the most total money on 
corrections, the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Delaware spent the 
most money per capita, at $251, $243, and $204 per citizen, 
respectively.131 In 2001, Florida spent the fifth most total money on 
corrections out of all states, but spent one of the lowest amounts per 
capita at $89 per citizen.132 Although not to the same extent as state 
governments, local governments share similarly large financial burdens 
when it comes to paying for incarceration. Since 1982, local 
governments have generally accounted for one-third of all corrections 
expenditures in the United States.133 The cost of incarceration in the 
United States, therefore, clearly impacts state and local governments far 
more than the federal government. And, like all of the other 
aforementioned trends, state and local corrections expenditures will 
only continue to increase.134 
The economic toll that our exuberant incarceration rates take on 
society is not limited to government expenditures. An astonishing study 
conducted by Pew’s Economic Mobility Project in 2010 revealed the 
damning implications that incarceration has on economic mobility, 
employment, lost earnings, and the American labor market.135 For 
example, whether an individual is incarcerated at any point in his life 
has a significant negative correlation to wage, weeks worked, and 
                                                                                                                     
 130. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE 
PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001 3 tbl.2 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf 
/spe01.pdf; see also NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE 
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 1 (2011), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/ 
files/pdf/FSS1111.PDF (finding that the average state spends 7.4% of its budget on 
corrections—the third largest piece of the pie in all state budgets—below only expenditures on 
education and Medicaid). 
 131. STEPHAN, supra note 130, at 3 tbl.2. California, New York, and Texas spent 
$4.2 billion, $2.8 billion, and $2.3 billion on corrections, respectively. Id. To get an idea of how 
greatly states vary on total correctional expenditures, North Dakota spent the least total money 
on corrections at $26.8 million (0.6% of California’s total expenditures) and West Virginia 
spent the least money per capita at $34 per citizen (13.5% of the District of Columbia’s rate). 
See id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. KYCKELHAHN, supra note 125, at 6 tbl.5; BUDGETARY COST, supra note 125, at 10 & 
fig.6. 
 134. See, e.g., Budget Summary, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR. (2010), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub 
/annual/0910/budget.html (reporting that total correctional expenditures soared to $2.3 billion in 
2010, an approximately 153% increase in expenditures since 2001). Cost per capita also 
increased 137% to $126 per citizen. Compare id. with State & County QuickFacts: Florida, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 10, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html 
(reporting Florida’s 2010 population at 18.8 million). 
 135. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, ECON. MOBILITY PROJECT, COLLATERAL COSTS: 
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 9–17 (2010), available at http://www.pewsta 
tes.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/Collateral_Costs(1).pdf. 
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overall annual salary after being released from prison.136 Only 16% of 
men who had previously been incarcerated earned over $36,400 in 
2006, while 21% earned less than $7,800; the remaining 63% of former 
inmates, therefore, only earned between $7,800 and $36,400 in 2006.137 
The Economic Mobility Project also found that incarceration decreases 
the likelihood that an ex-inmate will be able to improve his economic 
position.138 Overall, the Economic Mobility Project study concludes that 
“[w]ith so many people and families affected . . . discussions of 
mobility in America must include reference to crime policy and the 
criminal justice system.”139 Undoubtedly, the American obsession with 
prison as punishment leads to nothing but economic disparity for those 
who have served their time and perpetuates an endless cycle of poverty 
and crime for society. 
Incarceration has similarly dire implications for children and 
families. In 2010, 52.2% of all inmates reported having minor 
children.140 Approximately 58% of children with at least one parent in 
prison or jail are under the age of ten.141 According to the Urban 
Institute Justice Policy Center, “[l]osing a parent to prison affects 
multiple aspects of children’s lives and affects them to varying 
degrees.”142 In fact, in 2003 the Institute issued a report indicating the 
numerous developmental impacts that result when a child loses a parent 
to incarceration. In significant part, the report found that younger 
children (ten years or younger) endured abnormal stress, exhibited low 
self-esteem, and could not bond properly to family and peers.143 Perhaps 
more troubling, however, was the finding that older children (those 
between the ages of eleven and eighteen) exhibited abnormal behavior, 
rejected social norms, and were far more likely to engage in criminal 
activities, again perpetuating a criminal society.144 Continuing to 
incarcerate at such a high rate will only continue to fragment our 
families and ensure that a cycle of crime will exist in our culture. At 
some point, the social and economic consequences of incarceration 
prove unbearable. 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Id. at 11 & fig.4. At age 45, the average previously incarcerated man made $14.57 per 
hour and worked thirty-nine weeks per year, earning $23,500. See id. The average 45-year-old 
man who had never been incarcerated made $16.33 per hour and worked forty-eight weeks per 
year, earning $39,100. See id. 
 137. Id. at 17 & fig.8. 
 138. See id. at 16 & fig.7. 
 139. Id. at 27. 
 140. See id. at 18. 
 141. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 1 (2003) (revised 2005), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families_left_behind.pdf. 
 142. Id. at 2. 
 143. See id. at 3 tbl.1. 
 144. See id. 
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III.  BROWN V. PLATA: AN APPEAL TO HUMAN DIGNITY, OR UPHOLDING 
THE ABSURD? 
California is certainly no exception to the prison overcrowding 
epidemic that plagues the United States. For the last twenty years, The 
Golden State has been the epicenter of the prison reform debate, 
primarily as a result of extreme overcrowding and undeniable civil 
rights violations.145 In fact, overcrowding at several prisons in 
California has become so severe that inmates have staged hunger strikes 
to protest the poor conditions.146 Of course, the United States Supreme 
Court is no stranger to hearing prison overcrowding issues,147 but the 
Court was called on to answer a question of monumental effect in 
Brown v. Plata:148 what is the correct remedy for California’s 
overcrowded prison system?149 
Brown v. Plata came before the Court as two separate class action 
lawsuits drawing from numerous court battles beginning in 1990.150 A 
class of mentally ill prisoners filed the first class action, Coleman v. 
Brown, in 1990.151 A class of prisoners with other serious medical 
conditions filed the second, Plata v. Brown, in 2001.152 Both classes 
alleged that California’s overcrowded prison system had caused years of 
serious, uncorrected constitutional violations in defiance of the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,153 specifically 
that neither groups’ medical needs were being adequately addressed 
pursuant to statute.154 The district courts in both cases issued various 
                                                                                                                     
 145. See David Muradyan, California’s Response to Its Prison Overcrowding Crisis, 39 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 482, 484–85 (2008) (identifying California’s prison system as “both the 
largest and most overcrowded correctional system in the nation” with many facilities operating 
at over 200% capacity); Arnold Schwarzenegger, Proclamation 4278, Prison Overcrowding 
State of Emergency Proclamation, Oct. 4, 2006 (noting increased violence, transmission of 
infectious illnesses, inadequate sewage and wastewater systems, blackouts, contaminated 
drinking water, double- and triple-bunking, and an inability to provide adequate security as 
among the most serious civil rights violations throughout California’s prisons). 
 146. See, e.g., Lateef Mungin, Thousands of California Prisoners on Hunger Strike, CNN 
(Oct. 4, 2011, 1:36 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/04/justice/california-prison-hunger-
strike/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
 147. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1991) (holding that prison 
overcrowding by itself is not per se unconstitutional); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 
(1981) (considering the question whether double-celling—the practice of assigning two inmates 
to one cell—violates the Constitution). 
 148. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 149. Id. at 1922. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1926. 
 152. Id. 
 153. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 
 154. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1926–27. Both classes asserted a violation of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i), for failing to provide adequate 
medical and mental health care. Id. at 1923. 
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injunctive relief, ordering the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation to “provide . . . the minimum level of medical care 
required under the Eighth Amendment.”155 
However, after finding that prison conditions continued to violate 
the Eighth Amendment, the prisoners from Coleman and Plata moved 
in 2006 to convene a three-judge panel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) 
to limit California’s prison population so that it would be in compliance 
with the district courts’ orders for injunctive relief.156 Both district court 
judges granted plaintiffs’ motions and requested that the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals establish the panel.157 In 2007, the chief judge of the 
Ninth Circuit established a panel including himself and the two district 
court judges from Coleman and Plata.158 In 2009, the panel issued an 
order mandating a population limit on California’s prison system.159 
Finding that California had failed to comply with the previous orders for 
injunctive relief, the panel commanded California to reduce its prison 
population by 40,000 prisoners within two years.160 California appealed 
the panel’s order to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010.161 
Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy began by 
observing the Court’s long-held view of prisoners’ liberties in light of 
the Eighth Amendment: 
As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may 
be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty. Yet 
the law and the Constitution demand recognition of certain 
other rights. Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity 
inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment. “The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of 
man.”162 
Although society may deplore their choices to act criminally (and 
society certainly has the right to punish these choices), prisoners are 
nevertheless endowed with the unalienable right to human dignity. The 
Court recognized that this human dignity includes the right to food, 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Opinion and Order at 12, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088 (No. C01-1351 
TEH), available at http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caed/Documents/90cv520o10804.pdf (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1922. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1946. 
 160. Id. at 1923. 
 161. Id. at 1922. 
 162. Id. at 1928 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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clothing, and sufficient healthcare, since prisoners are unable to procure 
these provisions themselves and must rely entirely on the State.163 “A 
prison that deprives prisoners of . . . adequate medical care,” for 
example, “is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no 
place in civilized society.”164 
In affirming the panel’s finding that conditions in California’s 
prisons violated the Eight Amendment, the Court noted the deplorable 
state of California’s penal institutions: “Overcrowding has overtaken 
the limited resources of prison staff; imposed demands well beyond the 
capacity of medical and mental health facilities; and created unsanitary 
and unsafe conditions that make progress in the provision of care 
difficult or impossible to achieve.”165 Moreover, the Court also found 
that California’s prisons were severely understaffed; even if the prison 
system were operating at a reasonable capacity, there was no way to 
provide adequate healthcare given the dearth of surgeons, physicians, 
nurse practitioners, and psychiatrists.166 Consequently, California’s 
substantial prison overcrowding resulted in the State’s failure to provide 
adequate medical care, thus infringing on the human dignity that is 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
The Court then addressed the State’s argument that reducing prison 
population numbers was not the ideal solution to remedy these 
constitutional violations. Instead of releasing a certain number of 
prisoners in order to meet a specified population cap—arguably 
endangering the public—the State contended that other, less dangerous 
options were still available, such as new construction, transferring 
prisoners to other states, and hiring more medical personnel.167 While 
the majority agreed in theory, explaining that courts should “exercise 
[their] jurisdiction to accord the State considerable latitude to find 
mechanisms and make plans to correct the violations in a prompt and 
effective way consistent with public policy,” what seemed to be the 
breaking point for the Court was California’s inability to comply with 
previous orders demanding compliance with capacity plans.168 For 
example, in 2009, the three-judge panel enjoined the State of California 
to meet an agreed quota; the State failed.169 Early in the litigation, 
California had also offered a plan of its own to reduce prison 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. at 1923. 
 166. Id. at 1932. The trial record documented that 20% of surgical positions, 25% of 
physician positions, 39% of nurse practitioner positions, and 54.1% of psychiatrist positions 
within California’s prison system were vacant. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1937. 
 168. Id. at 1946. 
 169. Id. at 1926. 
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overcrowding, but the panel rejected this plan as insufficient.170 Two 
years of actual notice (not to mention at least two decades of 
constructive notice) and the subsequent failure to even remotely reduce 
prison overcrowding rendered the use of alternative remedies too little, 
too late. The Court concluded that the only remedy available was to 
order the State to reduce its prison population.171 
Justice Antonin Scalia crafted an unforgiving dissent in which 
Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Scalia characterized the 
majority’s holding as “disregard[ing] . . . the governing statute, and 
traditional constitutional limitations upon the power of a federal judge, 
in order to uphold the absurd” and as “a judicial travesty.”172 Justice 
Scalia’s primary argument against the majority was that it deviated too 
far from well-established substantive and procedural laws. 
First, Justice Scalia doubted the concept that prison overcrowding 
can create a substantive violation of the Eighth Amendment for an 
entire prison population.173 The fact that a prison system may be 
inadequate on a systemic level does not mean that every prisoner within 
that system is subject to cruel and unusual punishment.174 Justice Scalia 
contended that facing a “substantial risk” of future constitutional 
violations was not itself enough to establish a systemic constitutional 
violation.175 
Second, Justice Scalia asserted that the majority opinion made no 
sense considering the nature of the litigation. Brown v. Plata was a 
consolidation of class action claims. How is it an appropriate remedy, 
he asked, to release tens of thousands of prisoners who were never even 
members of the complaining class in the first place?176 Even if the 
individual members of the class (or the class as a whole) suffered 
injuries from constitutional violations, only those individual members of 
the class (or the entire class) were entitled to relief, no one else: 
[T]he vast majority of inmates most generously rewarded 
by the re-lease order—the 46,000 whose incarceration will 
be ended—do not form part of any aggrieved class even 
under the Court’s expansive notion of constitutional 
violation. Most of them will not be prisoners with medical 
conditions or severe mental illness; and many will 
undoubtedly be fine physical specimens who have 
                                                                                                                     
 170. Id. at 1941 (“At this time, the State has not proposed any realistic alternative to the 
[panel’s] order.”). 
 171. Id. at 1947 (“This extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy, 
and a remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding.”). 
 172. Id. at 1950–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 1951. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1952. 
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developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison 
gym.177 
At the very most, Justice Scalia maintained, only those members 
composing the aggrieved class should be removed from California’s 
prison system. 
Third, Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s ruling was a “structural 
injunction” that exceeded the Court’s powers as defined by Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution.178 Essentially, Justice Scalia believed that the 
majority acted as the administrator of California’s prisons, crafting 
policymaking decisions strictly reserved for the appropriate state 
administrative agency.179 In a second dissenting opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Samuel Alito echoed these same sentiments, 
writing that “[t]he Constitution does not give federal judges the 
authority to run state penal systems.”180 
Regardless of whether one views Brown v. Plata as protecting 
human dignity or “uphold[ing] the absurd,” the implications are clear: 
prison overcrowding can violate important substantive constitutional 
rights to which inmates are entitled. Moreover, Brown v. Plata paves 
the way for prisoners in other states to bring class actions. What remains 
unclear, however, is how to achieve court-imposed prison population 
limits—and, therefore, achieve constitutionally acceptable prison 
conditions—in light of overwhelming public opposition to releasing 
prisoners before they serve their full terms.181 
IV.  THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: HOW TO REDUCE PRISON 
POPULATIONS 
So far, this Note has demonstrated that the United States suffers 
from a prison-overcrowding crisis of unprecedented proportions, 
primarily resulting from a spike in mandatory minimum sentencing that 
began in the mid-1980s. Fortunately, after decades of skyrocketing 
incarceration rates, it seems that the United States Supreme Court 
finally addressed the issue in Brown v. Plata: overcrowding must end. 
In order for states and the federal government to comply with the 
Court’s ruling in Plata, immediate action is needed. There are myriad 
solutions to consider in remedying the prison-overcrowding crisis 
across the country. Some are simple, requiring very little to implement. 
Others, on the other hand, necessitate fundamental institutional change. 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Id. at 1952–53. 
 178. Id. at 1953 (internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 179. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 180. Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito also dissented on two evidentiary 
grounds: the three-judge panel refused to consider evidence regarding prison conditions and 
gave improper weight to evidence regarding public safety. Id. at 1959–60. 
 181. See Smolowe, supra note 17, at 55. 
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This Part proposes three primary solutions: (1) end mandatory minimum 
sentencing and return to judicial discretion; (2) reform prosecutorial 
practices and adhere to prosecutorial ethics; and (3) institute 
economically optimal punishments instead of punishments designed to 
maximize society’s retribution interest. 
A.  End Mandatory Minimums and Return to Judicial Discretion 
After decades of absurd results, political fear-mongering, and an 
overall failure to achieve the underlying goals of criminal punishment, it 
is finally time for our mandatory minimum experiment to end. As 
examined above, mandatory minimum sentencing schemes leave much 
to be desired. This Note therefore proposes a return to indeterminate 
sentencing and the restoration of judicial discretion to our criminal 
justice system. 
Determinate sentencing completely undermines the separation of 
powers and checks and balances doctrines upon which our government 
was founded. We entrust judges with discretionary power in all other 
circumstances; it is unconscionable that legislatures have robbed the 
judicial branch of the essence of its constitutional power.182 When a 
single institutional actor—the United States Sentencing Commission—
holds the vast majority of power regarding its designated function, 
tyranny results.183 On the other hand, “a sentencing system that sensibly 
distributes power—both the power to make sentencing rules and the 
power to determine sentences in particular cases—among the 
institutional sentencing actors is likely to work pretty well” and is likely 
to adhere to our notions of justice and separation of powers.184 
By now the evidence is sobering. With the largest incarceration rate 
in the world, the United States’ obsession with mandatory minimum 
sentencing has led to the destruction of too many lives. Federal and state 
judges’ hands are forced by sentencing guidelines to condemn 
nonviolent and simple drug offenders to years—even decades—in 
prison, away from their families, away from work, and away from 
necessary rehabilitative programs. Recidivism rates are on the rise, as 
recently released inmates have nothing to show for the years they have 
lost behind bars, forcing many to revert to crime. And the cost of our 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Legislatures, Judges, and Parole Boards: The 
Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1037, 1050 (2010) 
(“[J]udges have been furious that guidelines spurn judges’ skill and experience in evaluating 
deterrability and the ability [of defendants] to be rehabilitated and that the guidelines discard the 
individualized knowledge about the defendant that the judge gains during pretrial proceedings 
and trial.”). 
 183. See Aaron M. Clemens & Hon. Hale R. Stancil, Unhandcuffing Justice: Proposals to 
Return Rationality to Criminal Sentencing, 83 FLA. B.J. 54, 57 (2009). 
 184. Id. 
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obsession is also on the rise, as American taxpayers now dole out tens 
of billions of dollars every year for corrections. 
Furthermore, with the implementation of the “safety valve,” 
enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act, the Booker Court’s ruling that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are only “advisory,” and the fact that a 
number of states and judges are starting to reject mandatory minimums 
completely,185 we are slowly eroding the foundation of determinate 
sentencing. Considering all of these trends, why not continue to the only 
logical conclusion: end mandatory minimum sentencing. 
B.  Prosecutorial Reform and Adherence to Professional Standards of 
Ethics 
Addressing a group of United States Attorneys in 1940, then-
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson observed that “[w]hile the 
prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, 
when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the 
worst.”186 Unknown to Justice Jackson in 1940, however, prosecutors 
would gradually come to victimize—and themselves become victims 
of—an inherently unfair prosecutorial system. It is time to both reform 
the American prosecutorial system to pursue the public’s interest in 
justice and to recommit to the codes of ethics by which prosecutors are 
professionally bound. 
The twisted state of mandatory minimum laws and incarceration in 
the United States today is partly the result of a dysfunctional 
prosecutorial system. Prosecutors enjoy the “immense power to strike at 
citizens . . . with all the force of government itself.”187 Their power 
covers nearly all aspects of the criminal justice system, from the 
decision to charge an individual with a crime to recommending his 
sentence upon conviction.188 And it is the prosecutor, not the judge, who 
determines whether a downward or upward departure from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines is appropriate in a given case, thus permitting the 
prosecutor to determine questions of fact such as mitigating and 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (confirming that trial court 
judges may impose sentences outside prescribed guideline ranges); Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (determining that a trial judge who issues a sentence outside the prescribed 
guideline range is not presumed to have acted unreasonably). 
 186. Hon. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) (adapting a speech Justice Jackson made on Apr. 1, 1940). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
607, 626–28 (1999) (enumerating several of prosecutors’ abilities that make them “the most 
powerful lawyers” in our judicial system: to apply for search warrants and arrest warrants, to 
compel witnesses to testify, to initiate criminal proceedings, to drop charges, to accept or reject 
pleas, and to recommend sentencing). 
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aggravating factors ordinarily left to judges and juries.189 Today’s 
prosecutor is effectively judge, jury, and executioner. 
Because the law presumes that prosecutors act in the public’s best 
interest to pursue justice,190 and because there are few guidelines to 
steer prosecutorial decisions in the first place,191 the prosecutor’s power 
goes virtually unchecked.192 Justice George Sutherland poignantly 
expressed society’s expectations of the prosecutor in Berger v. United 
States:193 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and 
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim 
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 
. . . . 
[T]he average jury . . . has confidence that these 
obligations, which so plainly rest on the prosecuting 
attorney, will be faithfully observed.194 
                                                                                                                     
 189. In order for a defendant to receive a downward departure in sentence for Substantial 
Assistance to Authorities, the prosecution must make a motion to the court requesting such 
departure. Otherwise, the departure is not allowed. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5K1.1 (allowing downward departure “[u]pon motion of the government”); see also FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 35(b). The prosecution is also responsible for recommending to the court upward and 
downward departures in sentence for numerous other factors, such as crimes that result in death 
or severe physical injury, gang affiliation, or the defendant’s physical impairment. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0–§ 5K2.24. In any case, the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines’ general policy is to dissuade both upward and downward departures. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 cmt. n.5 (“[C]ircumstances warranting departure 
should be rare. Departures were never intended to permit sentencing courts to substitute their 
policy judgments for those of Congress and the Sentencing Commission.”). 
 190. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS 
Standard 3-1.2(c) (1993) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice . . . .”); Jackson, supra 
note 186, at 4 (“Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won if justice 
has been done.”). 
 191. See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities 
of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 557 (1999) (“[A] prosecutor’s individual 
and independent interest in reaching fair and just decisions is often the only compass pointing to 
the right procedure.”). 
 192. See Green, supra note 188, at 627 (“[C]riminal prosecutors are the most powerful 
lawyers because, with rare exception, their offices have unchecked authority . . . .”).  
 193. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
 194. Id. at 88; see also United States v. Wilson 149 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(“[G]overnment counsel is, as an individual, properly and highly respected by the members of 
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However, the nature of the American adversarial system, 
prosecutorial compensation, and lack of proper training ultimately 
undermine this presumption. Many prosecutors are prone to keeping 
score, as if they are players on a sports team.195 Prosecutors often 
compare conviction numbers for bragging rights.196 And, too frequently, 
comparisons lead to competitions in which prosecutors engage each 
other in contests—including gambling—to obtain the most 
convictions.197 Furthermore, prosecutors are rewarded with professional 
advancement based on convictions, not on whether justice has been 
achieved.198 
Surely not every prosecutor falls victim to such temptations, and this 
Note does not suggest that ours is a system rife with corruption at every 
level. But the mere fact that we propagate a system that enables, 
encourages, and protects malfeasance should warrant pause and deep 
consideration of solutions. Here, this Note proposes two. 
First, and perhaps most simply, prosecutors should recommit to the 
ethical standards expected both within the legal profession in general 
and for prosecutors specifically. Lawyers in all states must take an Oath 
of Admission in order to practice within that state’s jurisdiction. 
Florida’s oath, in relevant part, requires the affirmant to declare, “I do 
solemnly swear . . . I will not counsel or maintain any suit or 
proceedings which shall appear to me to be unjust . . . .”199 While the 
wording of every state’s oath is unique, the overall message intended is 
the same: all lawyers have a responsibility to pursue causes that are just, 
to abandon the unjust, and to uphold the honor of their position.200 
                                                                                                                     
the jury for his integrity, fairness, and impartiality.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
 195. Compare Kenneth Bresler, Essay, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep 
Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 546 (1996) (likening prosecutors to 
“jocks” who “make[] criminal trials resemble sporting matches”), with Thomas A. Hagemann, 
Essay, Confessions from a Scorekeeper: A Reply to Mr. Bresler, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151, 
157 (1996) (defending scorekeeping as a part of human nature). 
 196. See Hagemann, supra note 195, at 154–55. 
 197. E.g., Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, The Flip Side of a Fair Trial: Some Cook 
County Prosecutors Break the Rules to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, available at http://truthin 
justice.org/flipside.htm (listing several contests prosecutors play, including the “Two-Ton 
Contest”—in which the first prosecutor to convict defendants with a cumulative weight of 4000 
pounds wins a pot of money). 
 198. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
14, 1999, available at http://truthinjustice.org/cookcounty.htm (“Winning a conviction can 
accelerate a prosecutor’s career . . . .”). 
 199. Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar, FLA. BAR (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBProfess.nsf/basic+view/04E9EB581538255A85256B2F006C
CD7D?OpenDocument. 
 200. Florida’s Oath of Admission appears to mandate an even higher level of professional 
responsibility. Judge William M. Hoeveler of Florida’s Southern District observed that Florida’s 
Oath of Admission specifically refers to “honor” twice. Hon. William M. Hoeveler, Ethics and 
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Furthermore, prosecutors owe an enhanced ethical duty simply 
because they wield power on behalf of the sovereignty of the United 
States or the state in which they practice; prosecutors are servants of the 
people they represent.201 The American Bar Association (ABA) also 
recognizes the unique power of the prosecutor in its Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, a code of ethics by which all lawyers are 
bound.202 Model Rule 3.8—aptly titled “Special Responsibilities of a 
Prosecutor”—prohibits a prosecutor from “prosecuting a charge that the 
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”203 Many 
jurisdictions, including Florida, have also adopted the ABA’s 
Prosecution Function Standards, which enumerate various prosecutorial 
obligations.204 Of significant importance here are Discretion as to 
Noncriminal Disposition205 and Discretion in the Charging Decision,206 
both obliging prosecutors to consider trial diversion options and 
overarching concepts of justice instead of criminal prosecution. 
                                                                                                                     
the Prosecutor, 29 STETSON L. REV. 195, 195 n.1 (1999). First, the Oath requires Florida 
lawyers to employ only practices that are “consistent with truth and honor.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Immediately following this vow is another requiring the 
lawyer to “advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness . . . .” Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Judge Hoeveler concludes that Florida’s 
emphasis on honor means that “[t]he Florida Bar clearly enjoins the members to even higher 
standards than those set forth as rules of ethics.” Id. at 195.  
 201. See id. at 195–96 (examining the enhanced duties of the prosecutor in relation to other 
lawyers). 
 202. Interestingly, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not recognize any unique 
responsibilities owed by government-appointed public defense attorneys. See generally MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012). Although the ABA later promulgated the ABA STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS in 1993 to specify defense counsel’s 
duties and ethical standards, this notable absence of public defender responsibilities in the 
Model Rules indicates how truly significant the ABA views adherence to prosecutorial ethics. 
See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS (1993). 
 203. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2012); see also id. R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (“A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This 
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that . . . guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence . . . .” ). 
 204. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2012); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 4-3.8, cmt. (1993). 
 205. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS 
Standard 3-3.8 (1993) (requiring prosecutors to consider and be familiar with noncriminal 
avenues for disposing of cases involving first offenders or where “the nature of the offense may 
warrant noncriminal disposition”). 
 206. Id. Standard 3-3.9(b) (“The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause 
consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence 
may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may 
properly consider in exercising his or her discretion are . . . (ii) the extent of the harm caused by 
the offense; [and] (iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the 
particular offense or the offender . . . .”). 
33
Nauman: <i>Brown v. Plata</i>: Renewing the Call to End Mandatory Minimum
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
888 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
When prosecutors initiate and maintain criminal prosecutions 
against individuals like Tonya Drake, Jason Cohn, Keith Edwards, 
George Norris, Santos Reyes, and Richard Paey,207 they abandon their 
oaths and ethical responsibilities to seek justice. When prosecutors 
recommend the harshest possible sentences to courts in lieu of diversion 
programs, they cost taxpayers and states millions of dollars, destroy 
families, and perpetuate generations of criminals. When prosecutors 
initiate and maintain prosecutions that lack probable cause, they violate 
the ethical canons with which they have been charged both as lawyers 
and as representatives of the State. And when prosecutors pursue 
convictions for personal gain, they mock the very principles of justice 
on which our country was founded.208 All prosecutors should always 
exercise their discretion in favor of justice, in favor of honor, and in 
favor of their ethical duties. 
Second, it is time to reform the American prosecutorial system to 
properly reflect the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice. A problem that 
arises here, however, is how to induce prosecutorial agencies to abide 
by ethical standards in light of political concerns and overwhelming 
public pressures to be “tough-on-crime.” Professors Gary Becker and 
George Stigler propose a dual solution in which proper enforcement is 
rewarded and malfeasance is punished.209 
First, proper enforcement should be rewarded. At first glance it 
would appear that this is, in fact, how our system currently works; 
prosecutors are de facto compensated for the number of convictions 
earned through promotion. However, Professors Becker and Stigler 
emphasize that this piecemeal approach to enforcement only lends to 
abuse.210 Instead of inducing prosecutors to haphazardly amass 
prosecutions in order to meet a quota, the government should pay 
prosecutors a larger flat salary with no room for promotion; regardless 
of whether a prosecutor accumulates two prosecutions or two hundred 
in any given year, he or she should be compensated equally.211 By 
raising economic compensation for all prosecutors regardless of 
performance, we would increase the economic utility of doing a good 
job—pursuing justice—and reduce the economic utility of violating 
ethical and professional standards.212 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See supra notes 60–73 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Hoeveler, supra note 200, at 198 (“In the prosecutor’s charge lies the integrity of 
the criminal justice system, which gives validity to the Bill of Rights. If personal ambition or 
misguided zeal interfere with such a sacred mission, not only does the affected accused suffer, 
the virus of excess infects and weakens the system.”). 
 209. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–16 (1974). 
 210. Id. at 13–14. 
 211. Id. at 14. 
 212. Id. at 8 n.10. 
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In addition to rewarding proper enforcement, we must punish 
malfeasance. In a sense, we already punish malfeasance to some extent 
through the possibility of dismissal.213 Professors Becker and Stigler 
again emphasize, however, that dismissal is not enough. Because 
enforcers are already prone to cover up malfeasance and detection is 
expensive, we must provide a stronger economic disincentive—strong 
enough to overcome such evasion.214 Instead of dismissal, Professors 
Becker and Stigler advise that prosecutors should be forced to pay fines 
to defendants in cases where prosecution fails.215 Fines would ensure 
that prosecutors move forward only with meritorious cases and would 
encourage prosecutors to pursue trial diversion options such as 
probation, drug treatment, and community service, at the risk of losing 
money. In order to guarantee that prosecutors realign their interests with 
the interests of the public they serve, the government must properly 
reward and punish their conduct. 
C.  Optimal Fines as Punishment for Certain Crimes 
If an individual’s decision to commit a crime is essentially a balance 
between the risk of punishment and the potential fruits of the crime,216 it 
should be easy to sufficiently deter the optimal amount of people from 
committing that crime. Yet in the United States, our society has opted 
for a criminal punishment system that, in general, does not make the 
risks of crime sufficiently known to deter the potential criminal. The 
result has been painful, both economically and on a humanitarian level. 
Here, this Note offers Professor Gary Becker’s approach to punishing, 
deterring, and rehabilitating most nonviolent and drug-related offenses: 
optimal fines.217 
Professor Becker’s proposition is really quite simple: determine the 
value at which Crime X pays to the offender and impose a fine above 
that level.218 Simple economics takes care of the rest; the vast majority 
of criminals acting in their best interests will happily forgo an economic 
activity that has risks exceeding the rewards. Where the difficulty 
emerges is determining at what value above the tipping point of the 
risk–utility balance to set the fine.219 Surely a fine that is only $1 more 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Id. at 6. 
 214. Id. at 6, 8 n.10. 
 215. Id. at 15 (condemning the failure in the United States to compensate falsely accused 
and acquitted defendants as “a shameful flaw in our system of enforcement”). 
 216. See supra note 29 for a brief discussion on the economic considerations involved in 
the decision to commit a crime. 
 217. See Becker, supra note 29, at 27–33. 
 218. Id. at 14. 
 219. See id. at 28–29. Professor Becker notes that a number of factors contribute to this 
consideration, such as premeditation, sanity, age, sex, and income level, thus muddling the 
analysis. Id. 
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than the expected payoff would be rather useless, and a fine of 
$1 million would be extreme (and likely unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment). 
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Louis Kaplow further explain that 
Becker’s idea of optimal fines as punishment cannot truly be effective 
in a world where every criminal actor is different.220 For example, 
Bebchuk and Kaplow argue that some criminal actors are easier (and, 
therefore, more economically efficient) to apprehend than others.221 It 
will be difficult, if not impossible, to set an optimal level of punishment 
when each individual actor is deterred and apprehended in unique ways. 
Furthermore, it will not be possible to know what level of punishment is 
optimal for a particular crime until a sufficient number of criminal 
actors are apprehended (that is, when the population n is large enough to 
analyze). 
Professor Becker acknowledges these problems and suggests that 
the middle ground can be determined simply by observing criminal 
activity.222 By gradually increasing fines, we will eventually be able to 
establish where the optimal amount lies—the amount where the greatest 
number of people are deterred and the greatest amount of revenue is 
earned.223 In fact, as Professor Becker notes, most countries, including 
the United States, have drastically increased the use of fines to 
punish.224 In some European countries, for example, fines are imposed 
based on the offender’s annual or daily income.225 Sometimes called a 
“day fine,” this concept of income-based punishment has found limited 
application in the United States.226 It is now time to extend the concept 
of income-based punishment to nonviolent crimes and drug offenses in 
order to limit the number of offenders we incarcerate. 
Professor Steven Levitt suggests that Becker’s use of optimal fines 
as punishment (whether based on the offender’s income or not) might 
                                                                                                                     
 220. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions and Differences in 
Individuals’ Likelihood of Avoiding Detection, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 217–18 (1993). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Becker, supra note 29, at 14. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Id. at 27–28, 32–33. 
  225. See, e.g., Jason Paur, Swiss Slap Speeder With $290K Fine, WIRED (Jan. 8, 2010, 9:00 
AM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2010/01/record-speeding-fine-dents-swiss-bank-account; 
Swede Could Face Huge Speeding Fine—Up to $962,000, NBCNEWS (Aug. 11, 2010, 
2:44 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38660951/ns/world_news-europe/t/swede-could-face-
huge -speeding-fine. 
 226. See, e.g., Mel Reisner, Phoenix to Match Offense to Offender’s Daily Income: Crime 
and Punishment: A ‘Fine’ Idea, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-07-
23/news/mn-497_1_daily-income; see generally SUSAN TURNER & JOAN PETERSILIA, RAND, 
DAY FINES IN FOUR U.S. JURISDICTIONS (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/1 
63409.pdf (reporting the methods and results of day fine experiments in four areas: Maricopa 
County, Arizona; Des Moines, Iowa; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Marion, Malheur, Coos, and 
Josephine Counties in Oregon). 
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not be desirable because governments cannot effectively enforce fines 
unless a harsher punishment is also threatened, namely prison.227 
According to Levitt, fines are only useful if the criminal actor can 
actually pay (or is willing to pay) the fine.228 Levitt explains that 
governments will have a hard time enforcing fines for non-traffic 
related offenses for two reasons. First, only the criminal actor has 
perfect knowledge of his own resources.229 Criminal actors will 
undoubtedly lie or conceal sources of income and assets in order to 
avoid paying a fine or to pay a lesser fine. Furthermore, spending 
resources on discovering income and assets might be costly, so costly as 
to undermine the ultimate purpose of fines in the first place. Second, a 
criminal actor’s wealth might primarily consist of nonmonetary wealth 
(that is, human capital) that cannot be used to pay a fine.230 Levitt 
argues that in both cases, incarceration should be used as the primary 
stick to compel deterrence of criminal activity—although he agrees that 
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes ultimately result in inefficient 
punishment no matter whether fines or incarceration are imposed.231 
The problems raised by Professor Levitt are undoubtedly true. If a 
criminal actor is already willing to engage in criminal activity, he is 
probably not opposed to concealing income or assets in order to avoid 
or lessen his punishment. And there will always be some criminal actors 
who are simply unable to pay a fine. But Professor Levitt’s criticisms 
apply only to a small segment of society. Those individuals who earn 
enough money or own enough assets to be able to conceal that money or 
those assets are not committing the nonviolent street crimes for which 
Becker’s optimal fines would be imposed, namely minor drug use and 
possession offenses. And those individuals who are completely unable 
to pay a fine likely need other types of help, such as employment 
assistance, drug rehabilitation, or mental health services. For the vast 
majority of street crime, the general population will be sufficiently 
deterred from committing crimes through the use of optimal fines. 
In the end, fines are socially costless (or at the most, the cost to 
society is de minimis) and incarceration is socially costly.232 The 
estimated impact of converting our mandatory minimum prison 
sentencing schemes for nonviolent offenses to mandatory fine schemes 
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is considerable. The Center for Economic and Policy Research 
estimates that the savings from implementing fines for only half of 
nonviolent offenders in 2009 would have totaled almost $17 billion.233 
Moreover, our total prison population would have decreased by more 
than 700,000 inmates—approximately 30%.234 The budgetary savings 
alone warrant reflection on optimal fines as a viable alternative to 
imprisonment for certain offenses. And this of course does not even 
consider the potential revenue earned through fines. 
Let there be no doubt that fines would not present an adequate 
alternative to imprisonment for punishing all crimes. Society does have 
substantial noneconomic interests in punishing crime; the need for 
retribution—our innate desire for an eye for an eye—cannot be denied. 
However, when dealing with nonviolent offenses where there is no 
identifiable, individual victim, we must allow our retribution interest to 
yield to common sense. We need to be smarter. We simply cannot 
afford to incarcerate our people at the rate that we do. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past three decades, the United States has become the 
world’s largest jailor. It is no coincidence that this period also 
corresponds with the boom in mandatory minimum sentencing and the 
promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Empirically, there 
can no longer be any doubt that the American obsession with 
punishment—ideologically embodied within mandatory minimum 
schemes—created our incarceration disease. 
Now with Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court has 
finally indicated that it is willing to recognize and address the issue: 
overcrowded prisons create unconstitutional conditions that cannot be 
tolerated. Furthermore, the correct remedy is to reduce prison 
populations. Although the Supreme Court did not venture to answer the 
remaining question of how to reduce prison populations, the primary 
solution should be clear: if the proliferation of mandatory minimum 
sentencing is the disease, their abolition is the cure. 
In addition to ending mandatory minimum sentencing and restoring 
judicial discretion to our criminal justice system, there are two other 
viable solutions that also warrant consideration. First, prosecutorial 
reform and scrupulous adherence to professional standards of ethics will 
ease the burden on our entire judicial system. When prosecutors 
properly employ their discretion in favor of justice instead of 
compensation or career advancement, they ultimately serve the public. 
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Moreover, proper compensation and punishment structures can 
adequately incentivize prosecutors to perform their duties as ministers 
of justice. 
Second, using optimal fines as punishment whenever possible for 
nonviolent criminals and drug offenders in lieu of imprisonment can 
yield astonishing results. Public knowledge regarding punishments 
would increase, thus effectively deterring individuals who would 
otherwise engage in crime. America’s overall incarceration numbers 
would drop as much as 30%, saving tens of billions of dollars per year 
in correction costs. And, of course, revenue from fines would create 
much needed income during tough economic times. 
Overall, the United States will likely adhere to mandatory minimum 
schemes for the foreseeable future. But there is hope. The Court’s ruling 
in Brown v. Plata is the first step toward spurring initiative to reduce 
prison populations. Coupled with progressive thinking in states such as 
South Carolina and California, the American criminal justice system 
can gradually chip away at the mandatory minimum mess it has created. 
In time, our failed mandatory minimum experiment will end. 
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